Ecuador crisis 2025 is no longer a headline—it’s a reality. With historic debt, unprecedented violence, and a fragile democracy, President Daniel Noboa faces a nation on the brink. Can a new Constitution and centralized power reverse Ecuador’s collapse?
To understand the Ecuador crisis 2025, we must examine the economic, political, and social breakdown now testing the country’s very foundation.
A Country Deep in Debt
Ecuador’s fiscal landscape in 2025 is marked by significant challenges. The country faces a projected fiscal deficit of approximately USD 5.7 billion, with total financing needs—including debt repayments—exceeding USD 15 billion. Of this amount, over USD 9.2 billion is allocated to servicing internal and external debt, including nearly USD 1.5 billionowed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The nation’s total public debt stands at over USD 82 billion, a figure that, while deemed “technically sustainable” by the IMF, carries a high risk of default due to Ecuador’s fragile fiscal structure and a demanding repayment schedule.
To stabilize the economy, Ecuador entered into a four-year, USD 4 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF) agreement with the IMF. This arrangement aims to support the country’s efforts to improve living standards, protect vulnerable populations, and promote sustainable growth.
One of the notable outcomes of this agreement has been a significant reduction in Ecuador’s country risk index, which dropped from 1,908 points to 1,282 by April 14, 2025, following Noboa’s re-election and his public reaffirmation of fiscal commitments. This has helped improve investor confidence and could potentially lower borrowing costs for the nation (La República).
Additionally, Ecuador undertook a debt-for-nature swap in December 2024, worth USD 1.5 billion, resulting in USD 460 million for Amazon rainforest conservation and USD 800 million in fiscal savings projected by 2035.
Despite these efforts, the country’s future remains uncertain. It must balance fiscal reforms, debt obligations, and social unrest to move toward stability.
A Surge in Violence
Ecuador is grappling with an unprecedented wave of violence, marking a significant escalation in its internal security crisis. In the first quarter of 2025, the country recorded 2,361 violent deaths, a 65% increase compared to the same period in 2024 (Primicias). This surge reflects growing clashes between organized crime groups vying for control over drug trafficking corridors and territory. Criminal organizations, notably Los Choneros, have escalated their operations using military-grade weapons such as AK-47s, grenades, and machine guns. These groups regularly employ “sicarios” to carry out assassinations, kidnappings, and brutal public executions (Ecuavisa).
In response, on January 9, 2024, President Noboa declared an internal armed conflict, officially designating 22 gangs as terrorist organizations. This declaration gave the military full authorization to conduct joint operations with the police to restore public order. The severity of the situation was underscored by dramatic incidents such as the armed takeover of a live television broadcast in Guayaquil, where journalists were held hostage, and a gang clash in March 2025 that left 22 people dead in the same city (Reuters).
The impact of this violence has been deeply felt across all levels of Ecuadorian society. Extortion, kidnappings, and targeted killings have surged, while public trust in the police, judiciary, and broader government institutions continues to erode under the weight of criminal infiltration and impunity (Human Rights Watch).
Endless Political Polarization
The 2025 presidential election confirmed what Ecuador has lived with for more than a decade: a nation profoundly divided between supporters and opponents of Rafael Correa. This divide, far from weakening over time, has become the central axis of Ecuadorian political identity, affecting everything from public debate to institutional cooperation. In the April 13 runoff, President Daniel Noboa secured victory with 55.6% of the vote, defeating Luisa González of the Citizen Revolution movement. Voter turnout reached a remarkable 82%, a reflection not necessarily of enthusiasm, but of the electorate’s deep emotional investment in the outcome—on both sides.
Despite the official results and the endorsement of international observers, including the European Union and the Organization of American States, González and her allies alleged what they called a “grotesque fraud,” a claim that was swiftly rejected by monitoring bodies. While there was no credible evidence of systemic manipulation, the accusations resonated with a portion of the population already primed to distrust institutions.
The numbers told a compelling story. In the first round, both Noboa and González hovered around 44% of the vote, virtually tied. That statistical split revealed more than political competition—it reflected a country almost perfectly divided in its worldview, priorities, and memory of Correa’s legacy. For some, he remains a symbol of sovereignty and social inclusion; for others, of authoritarianism and corruption. That binary continues to dominate every political conversation, often at the expense of more urgent, pragmatic debates.
This division is not merely emotional—it is institutional. While Noboa holds the presidency, the National Assembly mirrors the political fracture. The Citizen Revolution controls 67 seats, Noboa’s Acción Democrática Nacional (ADN)66. That 1-seat gap is more than symbolic: it threatens to paralyze legislation, budgets, and reform efforts unless the president can build meaningful cross-party consensus.
Polarization has become a political strategy rather than a byproduct. Both camps rely on a loyal base that prefers confrontation over compromise. Social media, political influencers, and partisan media outlets amplify this dynamic, further radicalizing public opinion. The result is a country where moderates are few, and where shifting alliances are often seen as betrayals rather than democratic necessities.
This climate raises a fundamental question: Can Ecuador govern itself under these conditions? Or will polarization—more than debt, violence, or constitutional ambiguity—be the true obstacle to stability and progress?
Constitutional Reform on Hold
Shortly after securing his full term, President Daniel Noboa reiterated his ambition to convene a Constituent Assembly to replace Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution—a move he framed as necessary to modernize the state, confront organized crime, and streamline governance. Yet, as of this week, that initiative has been officially paused. The government appears to have recognized that the current political environment and public sentiment do not favor such a sweeping institutional overhaul. For now, the constitutional reset is off the table.
Still, the proposal itself offered a window into Noboa’s broader vision: a desire to reconfigure state power in the face of unprecedented crises. The initial reform agenda included controversial elements like allowing foreign military bases to operate on Ecuadorian soil, trimming institutional bureaucracy, and reshaping economic rules to attract international investment. These ideas stirred considerable debate. Even within Noboa’s cabinet, there were reservations—Minister of Government José de la Gasca openly called the Assembly “an extreme measure.” Outside the government, opposition groups accused the president of trying to centralize power under the guise of reform, drawing comparisons to leaders in the region who have used similar tactics to entrench themselves in office.
Despite the decision to shelve the Assembly, it would be a mistake to assume the administration has abandoned its reformist agenda. Rather, this may be a tactical pause. Noboa’s team will likely pursue targeted institutional reforms within the limits of the existing constitutional framework, testing whether it’s possible to produce structural change without rewriting the rulebook altogether.
This shift brings us back to a recurring theme in Ecuadorian politics: the tension between ambition and reality. Can a president transform a broken state using broken tools? Or will the limitations of the current system eventually stall even the most determined leader?
Final Thoughts
President Daniel Noboa begins his full term with something most Ecuadorian presidents have lacked in recent decades: real political capital. He holds the presidency, counts on initial public support, and has managed to reduce the country’s risk index in record time. But behind that political momentum lies a deeply fragile nation, structurally worn and socially exhausted. Ecuador enters 2025 with its public finances strained to the limit, its institutions weakened by infiltration and distrust, and its streets increasingly controlled by organized crime. Violence is no longer an exception but a daily reality, and confidence in the state has eroded as citizens grow tired of empty promises and perpetual political warfare.
In this context, Noboa’s greatest challenge isn’t just governing—it’s leading. And leading in Ecuador today requires much more than formal power. It demands the ability to build broad political consensus in a deeply divided legislature, to inspire public patience in a society that sees little improvement in daily life, and to preserve international credibility in the face of rising populist temptations. While he may control the executive, the true test lies in how much space society will give him to act—and for how long.
Because in Ecuador, power is fleeting. Approval can vanish overnight. And the window for meaningful reform tends to close faster than it opens. The critical question, then, is no longer simply “What will Noboa do with all this power?” but rather “What will the country allow him to do?” His ability to convert short-term authority into long-term transformation will define not only his presidency—but Ecuador’s near future.